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Focus paper
According to the UNAIDS 2012 report, 
globally, 34 million people were 
living with HIV at the end of 2011. 
HIV/AIDS is a major cause of death, 
having killed about 1.7 million people 
in that same year. The number of 
new infections was even higher (2.5 
million), suggesting an even more 
severe problem in the future. Sexual 
HIV transmission accounts for the 
overwhelming majority of the newly 
infected. The United Nations named 
combatting HIV/AIDS one of its eight 
Millennium Development Goals. The 
natural question is then: what are the 
effective policies? Prevention policies 
have been argued to be more cost-
effective than treatment1.  The obvious 
next question is: Which prevention 
policies have a greater impact?
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In a recent research paper,  Greenwood, 
Kircher, Santos and Tertilt (2013) use 
some modern tools of quantitative 
macroeconomics to shed light on the issue. 
With a calibrated model, the analysis of 
several policies is conducted. Earlier purely 
theoretical work focused on reductions 
in transmission risk and emphasized that 
it can lead to higher overall prevalence 
because people could get excessively risky2. 
In its 2012 report, UNAIDS warns that such 
“potential risk compensation effects are 
being closely scrutinized, but the dynamics 
are complex to track.” The constructed 
model can be used to study precisely this 
sort of dynamics.
HIV/AIDS in Africa
The continent most affected by the 
epidemic is Africa (see Figure 1), which 
hosts about two thirds of all HIV/AIDS 
infected people. Furthermore, the majority 
of the HIV-positive population in Africa is 
female, compared to less than one third 
in most developed countries – see World 
Development Indicators. This is due to the 
fact that most infections in Africa are due 
to heterosexual sex, the key mechanism in 
the study surveyed here.
The Republic of Malawi is an African 
country with a relatively high HIV/AIDS 
rate. There is very good data available for 
Malawi related to both the epidemic and 
general sexual behavior3.  So, the facts are 
clear: 11.8% of the population is infected 
(10.2% for males and 13.3% for females). 
Sexual behavior conducive to the spread 
of the disease is relatively common in 
Malawi. For example, condoms were used 
by less than half of all respondents in their 
last sexual act. The high prevalence of 
risky behavior does not necessarily imply 
that people are uninformed or irrational. 
In fact, research has shown that people 
in Malawi are relatively good in assessing 
their own probability of being infected 
with HIV4. 
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Figure 1
1See Canning (2006). 
2For a seminal paper in this literature, see 
Kremer (1996).
3The data for Malawi come from the micro 
data of the Demographic and Health Survey 
(DHS) in 2004.
4See Delavande and Kohler (2009).
This Focus paper is also publised by Vox, 
CEPR’s policy portal (May 2013) and is 
available from http://www.voxeu.org/article/
equilibrium-model-african-hivaids-epidemic
Using Economics to 
Model the HIV/AIDS 
Epidemic
Traditionally, two approaches have been 
taken to study the transmission of HIV/
AIDS in Africa: epidemiological studies and 
field experiments. Epidemiological studies 
are sophisticated in their treatment of 
equilibrium but usually lack a feedback 
loop that captures behavioral responses 
such as using more condoms when the 
risk of getting infected is higher. Field 
experiments are often conducted on a 
small scale and do not readily allow for the 
assessment of general equilibrium effects.
The main benefit that economics can 
bring to the field of epidemiology is 
the assumption that humans pick their 
sexual behavior on the basis of a rational 
benefit/cost calculation. This assumption 
allows one to study the potential 
behavioral responses of individuals with respect to particular 
policies. Moreover, at the heart of the HIV/AIDS epidemic is 
an externality, the transmission of a virus. General equilibrium 
modeling is well suited for the study of externalities. One can 
analyze how individual shifts in behavior feed back on each other 
in equilibrium. Thus, the great advantage of choice-theoretic 
equilibrium modeling is the joint assessment of both behavioral 
change and equilibrium adjustment in response to proposed 
policy interventions.
The model constructed in Greenwood, Kircher, Santos and Tertilt 
(2013) has three main ingredients. First, individuals select the 
type of sexual activity that they wish to participate in. They do 
this based upon beliefs about the riskiness of each type of activity. 
There are four types of sexual activity. A person may have a 
long-term relationship with a partner. They may also have short-
term relationships. These short-term relationships are further 
subdivided into ones that use a condom and ones that do not. 
Finally, a person can select to be abstinent.
Second, beliefs about the riskiness of various forms of sexual 
activity are formed rationally. In the analysis a person’s past sexual 
history is private information. Still, the fact that someone desires, 
say, a short-run sexual encounter involving no condom may signal 
something about his past sexual behavior; for example, just think 
about someone seeking unprotected sex at an African truck stop. 
Thus, people form rational forecasts about the likelihood of a 
partner having HIV/AIDS and the odds of getting HIV/AIDS if s/he 
engages in a particular type of relationship.
Third, the analysis is general equilibrium in nature. There are 
“markets” for the different types of sexual activities. People have 
differing tastes over various types of relationships and search 
accordingly on the various markets to fulfill their desires. They do 
this recognizing that some of these markets will be riskier than 
others. For example, a short-term relationship using a condom is 
safer than one that does not.
The constructed model is then tuned to fit aspects of the 
Malawian data. In particular, it is calibrated to match the HIV/
AIDS rates for men and women separately, the fraction of 
sexual relationships that are short term, the fraction of short-
term sexual encounters that use a condom, and the fraction of 
deaths that arise from HIV/AIDS. The model’s ability to match 
some lifecycle observations is also examined. These include the 
HIV/AIDS infection rate by age and the likelihood of a casual 
sexual encounter by age (see Figure 2). The 
distribution of a symptom-free person’s 
belief about being HIV/AIDS infected is also 
compared to its data counterpart (see Figure 
3). The model does very well at matching the 
data along these dimensions.
Lessons Learnt
The quantitative part of the study highlights 
the importance to take into account behavioral 
adjustments and equilibrium effects as they 
strongly affect the predicted effectiveness of 
a policy. The relevance of these effects is easy 
to see when compared to an epidemiological 
version without behavioral adjustment or 
small scale interventions without equilibrium 
effects5. 
To be more concrete, consider the effects of a 
general transmission reduction caused by, say, 
treating other sexually transmitted diseases 
(STDs). The idea is that the presence of 
other STDs makes a person more susceptible 
to contracting HIV.  The World Health 
Organization and UNAIDS consider that “STD 
management continues to be an essential 
component of HIV prevention programs and 
should continue to be a key component for 
AIDS control programs.” 6
Table 1 shows the simulation results for 
this policy in the quantitative model. As the 
transmission risk for both men and women 
declines by about 13%, the HIV incidence 
decreases by 1.5 percentage points from 
11.5 to 9.9%. Note that this decrease in HIV 
prevalence masks the finding that agents 
engage in riskier behavior. The fraction of 
sex that is casual increases even though 
there are less singles around. The reason is 
that the fraction of non-abstinent singles 
increases. Moreover, out of the singles having 
sex, condom usage falls. The upshot of this 
experiment is that agents can dramatically 
change their behavior in response to the 
policy and that these behavioral changes can 
have non-trivial effects, which can be seen as 
follows. 
Compare the benchmark results with the 
epidemiological version of the experiment. In 
the epidemiological experiment, the decline in 
HIV prevalence is much larger to 9.4%, a 0.5% 
difference compared to the benchmark. The 
reason for this difference is exactly the lack of 
behavioral changes described above. 
The field experiment goes in the opposite 
direction: it predicts a much smaller decrease 
in HIV incidence compared to the benchmark. 
The reason is that, in the field experiment, 
the reduced number of infections does 
not lead to an overall decrease in the 
population prevalence rate. Therefore, it 
does not feed back into lower infection 
rates for the treated population. It is 
interesting to note that eight of the 
nine studies of STD treatment for HIV 
prevention surveyed by Padian et al. (2010) 
delivered flat results. The simulations 
presented here highlight a novel reason 
that may explain these flat results, namely 
the missing general equilibrium effects in 
randomized field experiments.  
This study also showcases channels beyond 
the simple effect that some agents increase 
their risky sexual activity. For example, 
encouraging marriage may backfire and 
raise HIV prevalence mainly because some 
risky people now join the previously safe 
haven of marriage. While their move 
towards marriage is usually seen as a 
reduction in their own risky behavior, 
it increases the infection risk for their 
marriage partners who previously had a 
higher chance of finding a safe match. Such 
change in the mixing patterns seriously 
affects the effectiveness of the policy. 
Overall, this research program aims to 
develop tools to aid researchers and 
practitioners in their attempts to think 
through the various channels that 
are present in different interventions.  
Research using computational general 
equilibrium models to assess the 
implications that interventions might 
have on the spread of HIV/AIDS (or other 
diseases) is in its infancy and results have 
to be interpreted with caution. However, 
the model does provide a useful tool for 
elaborate thought experiments to 
discover areas that might need further 
investigation. 
Table 1: Treating Other STDs
    Benchmark Lower Risk Epidem. Small Field
Odds of not getting infected – men   0.940 0.948 0.948 0.948
Odds of not getting infected – women  0.895 0.902 0.902 0.902
HIV/AIDS rate, %   11.5 9.9 9.4 11.1
    - Men 10.2   8.7 8.3 9.8
    - Women   12.8 11.1 10.6 12.4
Fraction of sex that is casual, %  23.9 24.2 -- 24.3
Casual sex with condom, %  33.0 29.7 -- 30.9
Singles who have casual sex, %  54.0 57.6 -- 56.0
Men who are single, %   42.8 42.1 -- 42.6
Women who are single, %  38.7 37.9 -- 38.6
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Figure 2: Sexual Behavior by Age
Figure 3: Distribution of Subjective Beliefs
